The Passive Personality Principle and Its Use in Combatting International Terrorism by McCarthy, John G.
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 13, Issue 3 1989 Article 3
The Passive Personality Principle and Its Use
in Combatting International Terrorism
John G. McCarthy∗
∗
Copyright c©1989 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
The Passive Personality Principle and Its Use
in Combatting International Terrorism
John G. McCarthy
Abstract
The Note argues that the passive personality principle could be used by all countries in a
uniform manner in order to combat modern intl terrorism. It traces the intl community’s gradual
acceptance of the principle, analyzes the different ways different countries employ it, argues that
instead it should be used in a uniform manner, and concludes that this is the necessary response to
the type of intl terrorism that is a threat today.
NOTES
THE PASSIVE PERSONALITY PRINCIPLE AND ITS USE
IN COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM
INTRODUCTION
During the last few decades, the number of terrorist acts
around the world has increased dramatically.' During this
time, terrorists often have targeted victims due to their nation-
ality.2 Recent events throughout the world evidence the vul-
1. Mastrangelo, International Terrorism: A Regional and Global Overview, 1970-1986,
in THE ANNUAL ON TERRORISM - 1986, at 7 (Y. Alexander ed. 1987). This article
noted that
[iun 1970 a total of 293 terrorist attacks were recorded worldwide. By 1979
the figure had increased to 2,585 and during 19,85 the count had reached
3,010. In that seventeen-year span a grand total of 28,268 incidents were
recorded and over 52 per cent of that total has occurred in the past five
years.
Id.; see N. LIVINGSTONE & T. ARNOLD, FIGHTING BACK 12 (1986);see also U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, PATrERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1988, at 1 (1989) (reporting 856 incidents
of terrorism in 1988, up from 832 in 1987); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATrERNS OF
GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1986, at 1 (1988) (reporting 744 incidents of terrorism in
1986); Kane, Prosecuting International Terrorists in the United States Courts: Gaining the
Jurisdictional Threshold, 12 YALEJ. INT'L L. 294, 295 (1987) (noting that U.S. Depart-
ment of State reported 782 incidents of terrorism in 1985); Hannay, International Ter-
rorism: The Need for a Fresh Perspective, 8 INT'L LAW. 268, 268-70 (1974); Evans, A Pro-
posed Method of Control, 37J. AIR L. & COM. 171, 172 n.5 (1971). One reason for the
discrepancy in the above numbers is the inability of the international community to
agree on a uniform definition of terrorism. See infra note 163 (discussing the disa-
greement over the appropriate definition of international terrorism).
2. See Bell, Comment: The Origins of Modern Terrorism, 9 TERRORISM 307, 307-09
(1987); infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
There is no uniform definition of nationality in international law. See Research in
International Law, Harvard Law School, The Law of Nationality, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. 11, 21
(Spec. Supp. 1929) [hereinafter The Law of Nationality]; see also R. FLOURNOY & M.
HUDSON, A COLLECTION OF NATIONALITY LAws (1929) (containing examples of na-
tionality laws of several countries). Instead, the duty of defining nationality is gener-
ally left to individual states. See CONVENTION OF CERTAIN QUESTION RELATING TO THE
CONFLICT OF NATIONALITY LAws, Apr. 12, 1930, art. 1, 179 L.N.T.S. 89, 99; The Law of
Nationality, supra, at 80-82. But see Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4
(absence of genuine link in nationality by naturalization). Most states confer nation-
ality upon persons who are (1) born within the state, (2) born to a national of the
state, or (3) naturalized by the state. See The Law of Nationality, supra, at 21, 27-29; see
also Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (involving nationality by naturali-
zation); Alexander Tellech Case (U.S. v. Aus. & Hung.), 6 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 248
(1928) (involving dual nationality based on both place of birth (ins soli) and national-
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nerability of persons travelling or living outside their country.3
These events show that each country must find methods of in-
suring the safety of its nationals abroad.
Several countries have statutes that grant subject matter
jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed in foreign territo-
ries.4 The passive personality principle of jurisdiction is one
ity of parents (ius sanguinis)). See generally R. FLOURNOY & M. HUDSON, supra (contain-
ing examples of the nationality laws of several countries with these types of national-
ity requirements).
Under U.S. law, a U.S. national is "a citizen of the United States, or ... a person
who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes a permanent allegiance to the
United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (1988).
For the purposes of this Note, nationality shall mean "that quality or character
which arises from the fact of a person's [relation] to a nation or state. Nationality
determines the political status of the individual, especially with reference to allegiance
.... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 923-24 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis in original).
3. For example, on February 4, 1990, a group of terrorists raided a bus trans-
porting Israeli tourists in Egypt, killing eight and wounding seventeen. Cowell, 8
Killed and 17 Wounded in Raid On Bus of Israeli Tourists in Egypt, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5,
1990, at Al, col. 5. Also, terrorists murdered a U.S. serviceman during the hijacking
of Trans World Airlines flight 847 in June 1985 while the plane sat on a runway at
Beirut Airport. Berger, Gunmen Seize Jet in Mideast Flight; Passenger Killed, N.Y. Times,
June 15, 1985, at Al, col. 6. On October 8, 1985, another group of terrorists mur-
dered a U.S. national on board the Achille Lauro during a hijacking of the Italian ship
while it was sailing in the Mediterranean. Smith, The Voyage of the Achille Lauro, TIME
30, 30-31 (Oct. 21, 1985); Miller, Hyackers Yield Ship in Egypt; Passenger Slain, 400 Are
Safe; U.S. Assails Deal With Captors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at Al, col. 6. See gener-
ally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATrERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1988, at 8-44 (1989)
(noting incidents of terrorism that targeted nationals of various countries).
4. See, e.g., CODE DE PROC9DURE PENALE [C. PR. PEN.] art. 689, 1 (Dalloz 1987-
88) (Fra.) (granting jurisdiction over criminal acts committed by a foreigner in for-
eign territory that injure a French national); CODICE PENALE [C.P.] art. 7 (1930, as
amended 1983) (Italy) (granting jurisdiction over certain criminal acts committed
abroad by Italian citizens or foreigners); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1203, 2331 (1988) (granting
jurisdiction over certain crimes committed abroad by foreigners against U.S. nation-
als); see also Research in International Law Under the Auspices of the Faculty of the Harvard
Law School, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 443, 445 (Supp. 1935)
[hereinafter Harvard Research Project].
One commentator has identified three types ofjurisdiction in international law:
executive, judicial, and legislative. Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 146 (1974). Akehurst defined executive jurisdiction as "the power of
one State to perform acts in the territory of another State." Id. Judicial jurisdiction
is "the power of a State's courts to try cases involving a foreign element." Id. Legis-
lative jurisdiction is "the power of a State to apply its laws to cases involving a foreign
element." Id.
Jurisdiction, as referred to in this Note, includes both judicial and legislative ju-
risdiction-that is, the power of a state's court both to try cases and to apply the law
of its state in cases involving a foreign element. See id.
For the purposes of this Note, Professor Levitt's definition ofjurisdiction is ap-
plicable. Professor Levitt wrote that "[j]urisdiction over criminal offenses means the
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basis for the extension of a state's laws over acts committed
abroad.5 States have used this doctrine to protect their citizens
abroad.6 Although the principle is an accepted basis of juris-
diction under international law, there is much controversy over
the scope of crimes to which it applies.7
This Note argues that the passive personality principle
could be used by all countries in a uniform manner in order to
combat modern international terrorism. Part I analyzes the
passive personality principle and its gradual acceptance by the
international community. Part II sets forth the approaches
used by different countries regarding when the passive person-
ality principle may be used. Part III argues that there is a need
to apply the passive personality principle on a uniform basis.
Part III further argues that the principle should be limited uni-
formly to acts of international terrorism that are directed at
certain individuals because of their nationality. This Note con-
cludes that in response to the type of international terrorist
acts in today's society, there is a need for effective and uniform
application of the passive personality principle.
I. THE PASSIVE PERSONALITY PRINCIPLE OF
JURISDICTION
A. The Early History of the Passive Personality Principle
The passive personality principle' allows a country to ex-
power of a given court to inquire into and determine whether or not an alleged of-
fense has been committed by a designated accused person, and to apply the penalty
for an offense so determined." Levitt,Jurisdiction Over Crimes, 16J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 316, 319 (1925) (emphasis and footnote omitted).
5. See Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 445; infra notes 8-11, 42-45 and
accompanying text (discussing passive personality principle and other bases ofjuris-
diction under international law).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312 (1 1th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1137 (1985) (affirming conviction of a Colombian for robbery, conspiracy to
murder, and assault with a deadly weapon on U.S. agents in Colombia); United States
v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988), appeal docketed, No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir. Nov.
30, 1989) (applying U.S. laws to hijacking in Mediterranean because U.S. nationals
were on board plane).
7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 402 comment g [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; infra notes 92-140 and
accompanying text (discussing controversy over scope of principle's application).
8. The passive personality principle is also known as the passive nationality prin-
ciple. See I M. TRAVERS, LE DROIT PENAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (1920); Beckett, The
Exercise of CriminalJurisdiction Over Foreigners, 6 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 44, 55, 57 (1925).
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ercise jurisdiction over an act committed by an individual
outside of its territory because the victim is one of that coun-
try's nationals. 9 The passive personality principle is based on
the duty of a state to protect its nationals abroad.'" Under this
principle, the sovereign asserting jurisdiction is concerned
with the crime's effect, rather than where it occurs." The pas-
sive personality principle is the most controversial of the five
accepted bases of jurisdiction in international law.' 2 Histori-
9. Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 445. The principle is usually used
only to gain jurisdiction over the acts of a foreigner abroad; however, theoretically it
can be used to gain jurisdiction over the acts of a national abroad. Thus, there may
be an overlap between the passive personality and nationality principles. See infra
note 43 (discussing nationality principle).
10. See The Lotus Case (Fra. v. Turk.), P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10, at 55 (1923), 2
HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS 20, 60 (1929) (Lord Finlay, dissenting); see also
United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 901 (D.D.C. 1988), appeal docketed, No. 89-
3208 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1989) ("[The passive personality principle] recognizes that
each state has a legitimate interest in protecting the safety of its citizens when they
journey outside national boundaries."); Beckett, supra note 8, at 57-58; Sarkar, The
Proper Law of Crime in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 50, 66 (G.
Mueller & E. Wise eds. 1965).
In The Lotus Case, Lord Finlay stated:
The passing of such laws to affect aliens is defended on the ground that they
are necessary for the "protection" of the national. Every country has the
right and the duty to protect its nationals when out of their own country. If
crimes are committed against them when abroad, it may insist on the of-
fender being brought to justice ....
The Lotus Case, at 55, 2 HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS at 60 (Lord Finlay, dissent-
ing).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d
Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.). The Second Circuit held that "any state may impose liabili-
ties, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that
has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends." Id. This principle
is known as the "effects doctrine." See The Lotus Case, at 23, 2 HUDSON, WORLD
COURT REPORTS at 38; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, § 402(1)(c); Blakesley,
Jurisdiction as Legal Protection Against Terrorism, 19 CONN. L. REV. 895, 926 (1987).
12. See, e.g., Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 901 ("[T]he [passive personality] principle is
the most controversial of the five sources ofjurisdiction .... ); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 30(2) [hereinaf-
ter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]; M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLIT-
ICAL CRIMES 382 (1975) [hereinafter M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM]; M.
BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 255-56 (1974)
[hereinafter M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION]; I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 296 (2d ed. 1973); D. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAw 307
(1970); Beckett, supra note 8, at 58 ("It must be admitted that this claim to jurisdic-
tion has not received international sanction."); Kane, supra note 1, at 298-99; McGin-
ley, The Achille Lauro Affair - Implications for International Law, 52 TENN. L. REV. 691,
711-13 (1985); Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 578-79.
The principles of jurisdiction occasionally overlap and are frequently used in
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cally, the controversy concerning the passive personality prin-
ciple was whether or not it is a valid basis ofjurisdiction under
international law. 13 The basis for this controversy was that the
principle subjects an individual to the laws of a country with
which the individual's only connection is the victim's national-
ity. 14
In the late nineteenth century, the use of the passive per-
sonality principle was a source of conflict between certain
states. 15 The principle appeared in several states' penal codes
during the nineteenth century. 16 In 1886, Mexico's assertion
of passive personality jurisdiction caused great friction be-
tween the United States and Mexico.' 7 In Cutting's Case, 8 Mr.
Cutting, a U.S. citizen, published an article in a Texas newspa-
per criticizing a Mexican citizen with whom Mr. Cutting had a
disagreement.' 9 Mexican officials arrested Mr. Cutting when
combination by courts to acquire jurisdiction over an act. See United States v. Beni-
tez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1316 (11 th Cir. 1984) (holding jurisdiction proper under both
protective and passive personality principles), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1137 (1985);
United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 900-03 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding that court
had jurisdiction under both passive personality and universality principles), appeal
docketed, No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1989). See infra notes 42-45 for the defini-
tions of the other bases ofjurisdiction.
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 12, § 30(2); M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNA-
TIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 12, at 382; M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADI-
TION, supra note 12, at 255-56; I. BROWNLIE, supra note 12, at 296; D. GREIG, supra
note 12, at 307; Beckett, supra note 8, at 58; Kane, supra note 1, at 298-99; McGinley,
supra note 12, at 711-13; Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 578-79.
14. See D. GREIG, supra note 12, at 307 ("It would seem illogical to make jurisdic-
tion depend on the purely fortuitous fact of the victim's nationality."); infra notes 23-
37 and accompanying text (discussing The Lotus Case).
15. See Cutting's Case, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 1887 FOREIGN RELATIONS 751
(1888), 2 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 228 (1906) (conflict between United
States and Mexico over Mexico's use of the principle); infra notes 17-22 and accom-
panying text (discussing Cutting's Case).
16. See, e.g., CoDiGo PENAL PARA EL DISTRITO FEDERAL [C.P.D.F.] art. 186 (1886)
(Mex.); C6DIGO PENAL, art. 7 (1889) (Uru.). The Mexican statute provided that
"[p]enal offenses committed in a foreign country... by a foreigner against Mexicans,
may be punished in the Republic and according to its laws." Cuttings Case, at 760, 2
MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST at 230-31 (translating art. 186 of Mexican Penal
Code). The Uruguay penal code stated that its courts have jurisdiction over "of-
fenses committed in foreign territory by an alien, to the injury of a citizen." Harvard
Research Project, supra note 4, at 578 (translating art. 7 of Uruguay Penal Code).
17. See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (discussing conflict between
United States and Mexico).
18. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 1887 FOREIGN RELATIONS 751 (1888), 2 MOORE, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW DIGEST 228 (1906).
19. Id., 2 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST at 229.
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he was in Mexico and charged him with criminal libel.2" The
United States protested Mexico's assertion of passive personal-
ityjurisdiction over the crime. 2' The conflict concluded, how-
ever, without a decision on the validity of the passive personal-
ity principle because each country dropped the issue after Mr.
Cutting was released for diplomatic reasons.
During the early twentieth century, more countries imple-
mented the passive personality principle in their penal codes.23
Its use, however, once again became a source of conflict in
1926.24 In The Lotus Case,25 France objected to Turkey's asser-
tion of passive personality jurisdiction in accordance with the
Turkish Criminal Code.26 On the night of August 2, 1926, a
collision occurred on the high seas between a French steamer,
the S.S. Lotus, and a Turkish collier, the Boz-Kourt.27 The Turk-
ish ship sank as a result of the damage it sustained. 28 Eight of
the Turkish seamen on board the Boz-Kourt perished.29 The
French watch officer in charge of navigation of the S.S. Lotus at
the time of the collision voluntarily appeared before Turkish
authorities investigating the collision. 0 Turkish officials ar-
rested the French officer and the Turkish ship's first officer,
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. D. GREIG, supra note 12, at 307.
23. See, e.g., KEIHO (PENAL CODE), LAW No. 45 OF 1907 [KEIHO] art. 3 (Japan);
CODIGO PENAL art. 5 (1924) (Peru); CEZA HUKUKU art. 6 (1926) (Turk.). The Japa-
nese statute provided that "[its penal] law also applies to foreigners who have com-
mitted offenses . . . against Japanese subjects outside the Empire." Harvard Research
Project, supra note 4, at 578 (translating art. 3 of the Japanese penal code). Under
Peruvian law "[o]ffences committed outside the territory of the Republic shall be
punished [when the] . . . [o]ffences [are] . . . committed by an alien against a na-
tional." Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 579 (translating art. 5 of Peruvian
penal code). Turkish law stated that "[a]ny foreigner who . . . commits an offence
abroad to the prejudice ... of a Turkish subject.., shall be punished in accordance
with the Turkish Penal Code." The Lotus Case (Fra. v. Turk.), P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10,
at 15, 2 HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS 20, 31-32 (translating art. 6 of Turkish
criminal code).
24. See infra notes 25-37 and accompanying text (discussing conflict between
France and Turkey over Turkey's assertion of passive personality principle).
25. (Fra. v. Turk.), P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10 (1923), 2 HUDSON, WORLD COURT
REPORTS 20 (1929).
26. Id.; see CEZA HUKUKU art. 6 (1926) (Turk.). See supra note 23 for the relevant
portions of this statute.
27. The Lotus Case, at 10, 2 HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS at 28.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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charging them with manslaughter.3' On September 15, 1926,
the Turkish Criminal Court convicted and sentenced both of-
ficers for manslaughter. 2
France objected to Turkey's assertion of jurisdiction over
the act, and the two countries agreed to submit the case to the
Permanent Court of International Justice for determination. 3
In its decision, the majority refused to address the validity of
the passive personality principle because it determined that
Turkey had other valid grounds for jurisdiction. 34 Despite the
majority's refusal to address the passive personality principle,
each of the six dissenting judges addressed the issue.35 All of
the dissenting judges rejected the passive personality principle
because it did not conform with international law.36 The dis-
senting judges argued that under international law a country
could not extend its laws to cover alleged offenses committed
by foreigners outside the territory of that country.3 7
31. Id. at 11, 2 HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS at 28.
32. Id., 2 HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS at 29. The French officer was sen-
tenced to eighty days imprisonment and a fine of twenty-two pounds. Id. The first
officer of the Turkish ship was given a slightly more severe penalty. Id.
33. Id. at 12, 2 HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS at 29.
34. Id. at 22-23, 2 HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS at 38. The majority deter-
mined that Turkey had jurisdiction based on a combination of the objective territo-
rial theory (the effects doctrine) and the floating territory theory, by which a country
has territoriality jurisdiction over crimes that occur on its vessels as an extension of
its territory. See M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at 255
n.127.
35. The Lotus Case, (Fra. v. Turk.), P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 34-107 (1923), 2.
HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS 20, 46-91 (1929) (dissenting opinions). Six judges
found in favor of Turkey, and six found in favor of France. Berge, The Case of the S.S.
"Lotus", 26 MicH. L. REV. 361, 367 (1928). Pursuant to the rules of the Permanent
Court, the President of the Court voted again to break the tie vote in favor of Turkey.
Id.
36. The Lotus Case, at 34, 44-45, 57-58, 64, 91, 94, 102, 2 HUDSON, WORLD
COURT REPORTS at 47, 53-54, 61-62, 65, 81, 83, 88 (dissenting opinions).
37. See id. at 34, 44-45, 57-58, 64, 91, 94, 102, 2 HUDSON, WORLD COURT RE-
PORTS at 47, 53-54, 61-62, 65, 81, 83, 88 (dissenting opinions).
For example, one of the dissenting judges stated that "[t]he criminal law of a
State . . .cannot extend to offences committed by a foreigner in a foreign territory,
without infringing the sovereign rights of the foreign State concerned, since in that
State the State enacting the law has no jurisdiction." Id. at 35, 2 HUDSON, WORLD
COURT REPORTS at 47 (Loder, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original). Another judge
stated that "[tihe criminal jurisdiction of a State therefore is based on and limited by
the territorial area over which it exercises sovereignty. This is the principle, and it is
an indisputable principle of international law." Id. at 45, 2 HUDSON, WORLD COURT
REPORTS at 54 (Weiss, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original). Also, Judge Moore
wrote:
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In 1935, Harvard Law School published the results of its
research concerning international criminal law (the "Harvard
Research Project").38 One of the reasons that Harvard Law
School commenced an investigation into international penal
law was to create a draft international convention on criminal
jurisdiction.3 ° The introductory comment to the section onju-
risdiction stated that there was a need for cooperation among
the countries of the world in the area of international criminal
law.40 The need for cooperation and a model international pe-
nal code became more pronounced by the "increasing facility
of travel, transport and communication" of the 1930s. 4" The
Harvard Research Project noted that countries were utilizing
five bases of jurisdiction in criminal cases: territoriality,4 2 na-
tionality, 43 protective, 44 universality, 45 and passive personal-
I am of the opinion that the criminal proceedings in the case now before the
Court, so far as they rested on Article 6 of the Turkish Penal Code, were in
conflict with the following principles in international law: (1) that the juris-
diction of a State over the national territory is exclusive; (2) that foreigners
visiting a country are subject to the local law, and must look to the courts of
that country for their judicial protection; (3) that a State cannot rightfully
assume to punish foreigners for alleged infractions of laws to which they
were not, at the time of the alleged offence, in any wise subject.
Id. at 94, 2 HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS at 83 (Moore, J. dissenting).
One commentator has asserted that Judge Moore's off-handed rejection of the
passive personality principle under international law was incorrect. See Berge, supra
note 35, at 382.
38. Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 1.
39. Id. Harvard Law School also presented reports on extradition and the law of
treaties. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 443.
42. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, § 402(l)(a); Harvard Research Project,
supra note 4, at 445; see also 1 M. TRAVERS, supra note 8, at 73. The territoriality
principle is the most widely accepted of the principles. Akehurst, supra note 4, at 152;
Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 445. Territoriality jurisdiction is based on the
occurrence of the criminal act within the country seeking to exercise jurisdiction over
it. L. HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 823 (1987); Sarkar, supra
note 10, at 52; Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 445. The sovereign's interest
in maintaining order within its territory is the justification for this principle. Harvard
Research Project, supra note 4, at 483; see Akehurst, supra note 4, at 152; Beckett, supra
note 10, at 55-56; McGinley, supra note 12, at 707; Sarkar, supra note 10, at 52.
43. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, § 402(2); Harvard Research Project,
supra note 4, at 445; see also I M. TRAVERS, supra note 8, at 73. The nationality princi-
ple is based on the nationality of the alleged criminal. Harvard Research Project, supra
note 4, at 519; see In Re Di Lisi, 7 I.L.R. 193 (Italy Court of Cassation 1934) (af-
firming conviction of Italian national for conspiring in the United States to forge
travelers checks); X. v. Public Prosecutor, 19 I.L.R. 226 (Neth. Court of Appeal of
The Hague 1952) (affirming conviction of a Dutch national for crime committed
305
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ity.
4 6
At the time of the Harvard Research Project, some form of
passive personality jurisdiction existed in a number of coun-
tries' criminal statutes. 4 7 The Harvard Research Project, how-
ever, did not include passive personality jurisdiction in its
Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime (the
"Draft Convention").48 The Harvard Research Project stated
that the passive personality principle could be justified only if
it were circumscribed with certain safeguards in order to limit
outside territory of the Netherlands). The nationality principle isjustified by the sov-
ereign's interest in retaining control over the acts of its nationals wherever they may
be. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for
Foreign Violators of International Law Under FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J.
INT'L L. 191, 202-03 (1983); see Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 519; see also
Sarkar, supra note 10, at 66. Another justification for the nationality principle is "that
the protection of nationals abroad gives rise to a reciprocal duty of obedience."
Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 520; see Sarkar, supra note 10, at 61-62.
44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, § 403(3); Harvard Research Project,
supra note 4, at 445; see also 1 M. TRAVERS, supra note 8, at 73. The protective princi-
ple relies on the concept that a country should be able to protect its interests against
criminal acts. Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 543; see Sarkar, supra note 10, at
68. The protective principle requires that jurisdiction be used to protect a security
interest or the operation of the country's governmental functions. Nusselein v. Bel-
gian State, 17 I.L.R. 136 (Belg. Court of Cassation 1950) (holding that Belgian courts
had jurisdiction to try case involving a foreign soldier for acts committed against
safety of Belgium); Public Prosecutor v. L., 18 I.L.R. 206 (Neth. Supreme Court
1951) (affirming conviction of Belgian national as accessory to counterfeiting cur-
rency of the Netherlands when acts occurred in Belgium); L. HENKIN, supra note 42,
at 823; Kane, supra note 1, at 299; Paust, supra note 43, at 209.
45. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, § 404; Harvard Research Project, supra
note 4, at 445; see also 1 M. TRAVERS, supra note 8, at 73. The universality principle is
based on the theory that certain crimes are so egregious that all nations have an
interest in exercising jurisdiction to combat them. L. HENKIN, supra note 42, at 823;
Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 785, 788
(1988). Piracy, slave trading, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes,
and drug trafficking are all considered to be such "universal" crimes. McCredie, Con-
temporary Use of Force Against Terrorism: The United States Response to Achille Lauro -
Questions of Jurisdiction and its Exercise, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COM. L. 435, 439 (1986).
46. Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 445; L. HENKIN, supra note 42, at 823.
47. Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 578 (noting that the following coun-
tries were in 1935 asserting some type of passive personality jurisdiction: Albania,
Brazil, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Italy, Ja-
pan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Monaco, Peru, Poland, Rumania, San Marino, the
Soviet Union, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia).
48. See Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 439-42; see also M. BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at 256; Kane, supra note 1, at 298-99
(noting that passive personality jurisdiction was not included in the Draft Convention
with Respect to Crime which was published in the Harvard Research Project).
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the scope of the principle's application. 49 With the inclusion
of the particular safeguards, almost every case covered by the
passive personality principle would be covered by the univer-
sality principle. 50 The Harvard Research Project did not in-
clude passive personality jurisdiction in its Draft Convention
because of the overlap between the passive personality and
universality principles. 5 ' Since the Harvard Research Project
was published, however, numerous courts and scholars have
accepted the bases of jurisdiction it identified, including the
passive personality principle.52
B. Current Application of the Passive Personality Principle
Although the validity of the passive personality principle
was the subject of controversy during the early part of this cen-
tury,53 over the last two decades the international community
has increasingly accepted the use of the passive personality
principle. 4 The recent acceptance, however, is limited to the
49. Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 579. Although the Harvard Research
Project does not state which safeguards should be applied to the passive personality
principle, it does state that "the essential safeguards and limitations are precisely
those by which the principle of universality is circumscribed in [article 10 of the Draft
Convention with Respect to Crime]." Id. Article 10 applies the universality principle
to crimes committed abroad by an alien when it is an offense where it is committed, if
the state with territoriality jurisdiction refuses to prosecute, and prosecution is not
time barred. Id. at 440-41.
50. Id. at 579; see I. BROWNLIE, supra note 12, at 296 (noting that there is overlap
between passive personality and universality principles).
51. Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 579; see I. BROWNLIE, supra note 12, at
296 ("[Mlany of [the passive personality principle's] applications fall under the prin-
ciples of protection and universality.").
52. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 900 (D.D.C. 1988), appeal docketed,
No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1989); see Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d
1308, 1311 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1031 (1985); Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003
(1985); United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 257 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1110 (1983); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 884 (1967); W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 440 (1962);
A. D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 564 (1980).
53. See The Lotus Case (Fra. v. Turk.), P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (1923), 2 HUDSON,
WORLD COURT REPORTS 20 (1929) (rejection by France of passive personality princi-
ple); Cutting's Case, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 1887 FOREIGN RELATIONS 751 (1888), 2
MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 228 (1906) (noting U.S. rejection of principle).
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, § 402 comment g; see United States v.
Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 901 (D.D.C. 1988), appeal docketed, No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 30, 1989) ("Although many legal scholars agree that the principle is the most
controversial of the five sources ofjurisdiction, they also agree that the international
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principle's application against international terrorism, and not
to ordinary torts and crimes, which are considered within the
strict domain of the sovereign where these acts occur.55 This
limitation is due to the international communtity's desire to
balance the interests of the country whose national has been
victimized against that of the country with territoriality juris-
diction.56 In this manner the sovereignty interests of the coun-
try with territoriality jurisdiction can be protected.57
The recent acceptance of the passive personality principle
was evidenced in the 1970s by the codification of the principle
by certain countries.58 In 1972, Israel amended its criminal
laws by codifying the passive personality principle.59 Three
years later, the French legislature also amended its penal code
to include passive personality jurisdiction.60 This amendment
community recognizes its legitimacy."); Paust, supra note 43, at 203 ("[T]he extrater-
ritorial reach of such a law premised upon ...the [passive personality principle]
would not be in doubt as a matter of international law."); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984 AND OTHER CRIMI-
NAL STATUTES ENACTED BY THE 98TH CONGRESS 200 (1984) ("Congress chose to pro-
vide such protection for Americans by utilizing ... the 'passive personality' (i.e., na-
tionality of the victim) basis for. extraterritorial jurisdiction under international
law.").
55. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, § 402 comment g. Comment g states
that "[t]he principle has not been generally accepted for ordinary torts or crimes, but
it is increasingly accepted as applied to terrorist and other organized attacks on a
state's nationals by reason of their nationality, or to assassination of a state's diplo-
matic representatives or other officials." Id.
56. The Lotus Case, at 35 (1923), 2 HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS at 47
(Loder, J. dissenting); see infra note 165 (discussing infringement of sovereignty
caused by use of passive personality principle).
57. The Lotus Case, at 35, 2 HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS at 47 (Loder, J.
dissenting); see infra note 165 (discussing infringement of sovereignty where passive
personality principle used).
58. See infra notes 59-63.
59. Penal Law Amendment (Offenses Committed Abroad) (Amendment No. 4)
Law 5732, 26 LAws OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL (official translation prepared at the Minis-
try of Justice, 1971-72). The amendment provides that
[t]he courts in Israel shall be competent to try in Israel under Israeli law a
person who has committed abroad an act which would be an offence if it had
been committed in Israel and which harmed or was intended to harm the
life, person, health, freedom or property of a national or resident of Israel.
Id.; see Bassiouni, Theories ofJurisdiction and Their Application in Extradition Law and Prac-
tice, 5 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 46 (1974).
60. C. PR. PEN. art. 689, 1 (Dalloz 1987-88) (Fra.). This amendment provided
that "[a]ny foreigner who, beyond the territory of the Republic, is guilty of a crime,
either as author or accomplice, may be prosecuted and convicted in accordance with
the disposition of French law, when the victim of the crime is a French national."
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is particularly noteworthy in light of the objections raised by
the French government to the assertion of passive personality
jurisdiction by Turkey in The Lotus Case in 1926.61 The Turk-
ish statute at issue in The Lotus Case granted passive personal-
ity jurisdiction over a limited number of crimes.62 The new
French statute, however, allows passive personality jurisdiction
over all crimes committed abroad by foreigners to the preju-
dice of French nationals.63
U.S. courts have also begun to apply the passive personal-
ity principle. 6" In United States v. Benitez,65 the defendant, a Co-
lombian national, was convicted of conspiring to murder U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration agents in Colombia.66 In
Benitez, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that
the United States gained jurisdiction on both the passive per-
sonality and protective principles.67
Moreover, in United States v. Yunis,6 8 the United States
prosecuted a Lebanese citizen for hijacking a Jordanian air-
plane in the Mediterranean in June 1985.69 The only nexus
between the hijacking and the United States was the presence
Blakesley, supra note 11, at 938 n.140 (translating art. 689, 1 of the French Code of
Criminal Procedure).
61. The Lotus Case (Fra. v. Turk.), P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 6, 2 HUDSON,
WORLD COURT REPORTS 20, 24 (1929). For a discussion of The Lotus Case, see supra
notes 24-37 and accompanying text.
62. See CEZA HUKUKU art. 6 (1926) (Turk.). The Turkish criminal code limited
passive personality jurisdiction to offenses not included in article 4 of the Turkish
criminal code (various forms of counterfeiting) and which carried a sentence of more
than one year of loss of freedom. Id.
63. C. PR. PEN. art. 689, 1 (Dalloz 1987-88) (Fra.); see Blakesley, supra note 11,
at 938-40.
64. See infra notes 65-73 and accompanying text (discussing acceptance of pas-
sive personality principle by U.S. courts).
65. 741 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1137 (1985).
66. Benitez, 741 F.2d at 1313-15.
67. Id. at 1316. The court held that
jurisdiction exists in this case under [the protective and passive personality
principles]. Under the protective principle, the crime certainly had a poten-
tially adverse effect upon the security or governmental function of the
[United States]. Furthermore, the nationality of the victims, who are also
United States government agents, clearly supports jurisdiction.
Id. (citations omitted). For a discussion of the protective principle, see supra note 44.
68. 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988), appeal docketed, No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir. Nov.
30, 1989).
69. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 899.
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of U.S. nationals on board the hijacked plane.7" In March
1989, a jury in the District Court for the District of Columbia
convicted the defendant of hijacking and other crimes.7 One
of the bases for the jurisdiction of the U.S. court over the hi-
jacking was the passive personality principle.72 The court held
that the U.S.. assertion of passive personality jurisdiction was
proper under both international law and U.S. law.73
Furthermore, an analysis of U.S. actions in the Achille
Lauro affair also demonstrates U.S. acceptance of the passive
personality principle. 4 On October 7, 1985, members of the
Palestine Liberation Front seized the Achille Lauro, an Italian
cruise ship, and murdered one passenger. 75  The passenger
killed was one of twenty-eight U.S. nationals on board the
ship.7 6 In order to terminate the hijacking, Egypt provided an
aircraft to the hijackers. 77 U.S. fighter planes forced the air-
70. Id.
71. Engelberg, U.S. Convicts Arab inJet's Hiacking, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1989, at
A3, col. 4. On October 4, 1989, Mr. Yunis was sentenced by the district court to five
years of incarceration for conspiracy, twenty years for air piracy, and thirty years for
hostage taking. Reuters, Lebanese Hyacker Given a 30-Year Sentence, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5,
1989, at A7, col. 1. The sentences are to run concurrently. Id.
72. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 900-03 (court also relied on universality principle); see
supra note 45 (discussing universality principle).
73. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 900-03 (D.D.C. 1988), appeal dock-
eted, No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1989).
74. See Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 900-03 (discussing U.S. assertion of passive per-
sonality jurisdiction in Achille Lauro affair); McGinley, supra note 12, at 710-13 (dis-
cussing U.S. acceptance of passive personality jurisdiction in Achille Lauro affair).
75. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 902-03; Miller, Hyackers Yield Ship in Egypt; Passenger
Slain, 400 Are Safe; U.S. Assails Deal With Captors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at Al, col.
6.
76. See McCredie, supra note 46, at 436.
77. Gwertzman, U.S. Intercepts Jet Carrying Hyackers; Fighters Divert It To NATO Base
In Italy; Gunmen Face Trial In Slaying of Hostage, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at Al, col.
6. At the time, the Achille Lauro was in the territorial waters of Egypt. Smith, The
Voyage of the Achille Lauro, TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, 30; Tagliabue, Ship Carrying 400 is
Seized; Hjackers Demand Release of 5O Palestinians in Israel, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at
Al, col. 6. The hijackers threatened to blow up the boat unless Israel agreed to
release several Palestinians who were imprisoned in Israel. Id. On October 9, when
it appeared that Israel would not negotiate, Egypt allowed the Palestine Liberation
Organization to remove the hijackers from the ship. Id.; Gwertzman, State Department
Angry at Speedy Accord With Gunmen, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at Al, col. 3. On Octo-
ber 10, 1985 the Egyptian government allowed the hijackers to travel on an Egyptian
commercial aircraft to Tunisia. Gwertzman, U.S. Intercepts Jet Carrying Hjackers; Fight-
ers Divert It To NA TO Base In Italy; Gunmen Face Trial In Slaying of Hostage, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 11, 1985. at Al, col. 6.
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craft carrying the Achille Lauro hijackers to land in Italy.78 As-
serting jurisdiction on the basis of the passive personality prin-
ciple, the United States requested that Italy extradite the of-
fenders to the United States to stand trial for the murder of the
U.S. national.79 Although Italy refused to extradite the hijack-
ers,8 o the U.S. actions illustrate U.S. recognition of the passive
personality principle.8 '
Two recent U.S. statutes similarly evidence the U.S. ac-
ceptance of the passive personality principle. 2 The first stat-
ute, the Hostage Taking Act of 1984 (the "Hostage Taking
Act"),83 which was used in Yunis,84 grants jurisdiction over hos-
tage takings committed by individuals outside the United
States when the victims are U.S. nationals. 85 The second stat-
ute, the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of
1986 (the "Antiterrorism Act"), 86 involves the assertion of pas-
sive personality jurisdiction over violent crimes that are com-
mitted abroad by foreigners that injure U.S. nationals.87
78. Gwertzman, U.S. Intercepts Jet Carrying Hiackers; Fighters Divert It To NA TO Base
In Italy; Gunmen Face Trial In Slaying of Hostage, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at Al, col.
6.
79. Id.; see Briefing by National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane on the Ap-
prehension of the Achille Lauro Hijackers, Oct. 11, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1516, 1517 (1985).
80. The U.S.-Italian Quarrel, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1985, at A8, col. 5.
81. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 900-03 (D.D.C. 1988) (discussing
U.S. assertion of passive personality jurisdiction in Achille Lauro affair), appeal docketed,
No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1989); McGinley, supra note 12, at 710-13 (discuss-
ing U.S. acceptance of passive personality jurisdiction in Achille Laura affair).
Since the Achille Lauro affair, the International Maritime Organization has
adopted a Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, done Mar. 10, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 672. The Convention allows ju-
risdiction over unlawful acts at sea based on the floating territory, territoriality, na-
tionality, protective, and passive personality theories. Id. at 675-76. The Convention
also allows jurisdiction when the offender is a stateless person with residence in the
prosecuting state. Id.
82. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1203, 2331 (1988).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1988).
84. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 904-05 (D.D.C. 1988), appeal
docketed, No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1989).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(1)(A) (1988). The Hostage Taking Act makes it a crime
punishable in the United States to take hostages outside the United States when "the
person seized or detained is a national of the United States." Id.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988).
87. Id. The Antiterrorism Act provides that "[w]hoever kills a national of the
United States, while such national is outside the United States, shall [be fined or
imprisoned by U.S. courts under U.S. law]." Id.
One commentator has suggested that this statute is not meant to adopt the pas-
sive personality principle but only the protective principle. See Blakesley, supra note
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The debate concerning the validity of the passive person-
ality principle has waxed and waned.8" Even though the
Harvard Research Project rejected the principle in 1935, at
that time it was considered valid under international law be-
cause enough countries had accepted it. 9 Since the Harvard
Research Project, other countries have codified the principle,90
including France and the United States, two countries that had
initially opposed the principle."
II. METHODS OF APPLYING THE PASSIVE PERSONALITY
PRINCIPLE
There is no uniformity as to the methods of applying the
11, at 942. However, an analysis of the wording of the statute, its legislative history,
and the requirements of the protective principle show that this position is untenable.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 783, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 87,
reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1926, 1960; supra note 44 (discuss-
ing protective principle). The statute requires only that a crime injure a U.S. na-
tional. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988). The protective principle, however, requires the in-
fringement of a security interest of the country seeking to assert jurisdiction. Harvard
Research Project, supra note 4, at 543. The protection of nationals abroad does not rise
to the level of a security interest under international law. See United States v. Yunis,
681 F. Supp. 896, 903 n.14 (D.D.C. 1988), appeal docketed, No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 30, 1989). Also, in the legislative history of the Antiterrorism Act, Congress
stated that "[tihe elements are (1) the murder (2) of a U.S. national (3) outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States." H.R. CONE. REP. No. 783, supra, at 87.
These are the requirements of the passive personality principle, not the protective
principle. See Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 445; supra notes 8-11, 44 and
accompanying text (discussing passive personality principle and protective principle).
88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, § 402 comment g. Comment g
states that "[tihe principle has not been generally accepted for ordinary torts or
crimes, but it is increasingly accepted as applied to terrorist and other organized
attacks on a state's nationals by reason of their nationality, or to assassination of a
state's diplomatic representatives or other officials." Id.
89. See Berge, supra note 35, at 381-82. Berge states that "[w]hen such a re-
spectable number of nations make claims of varying degrees of extravagance, it is
difficult to say that [it] is settled [that the passive personality principle is invalid under
international law]." Id. (discussing rejection of principle by Lotus dissenters a decade
prior to Harvard Research Project); see supra note 47 and accompanying text (listing
countries that Harvard Research Project described as utilizing passive personality princi-
ple in 1935).
90. See C. PR. PEN. art. 689, 1 (Dalloz 1987-88) (Fra.); Penal Law Amendment
(Offenses Committed Abroad) (Amendment No. 4) Law 5732, 26 LAWS OF THE STATE
OF ISRAEL (official translation prepared at the Ministry ofJustice, 1971-72); 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1203, 2331 (1988).
91. See supra notes 60-87 and accompanying text (discussing French and U.S.
acceptance of passive personality principle).
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passive personality principle.92 Countries that have codified
the passive personality principle utilize one or more of seven
possible methods in its application. First, the principle can
be applied broadly to cover all crimes.94 Second, the principle
is used in cases involving specifically enumerated crimes.95 A
third method employed exercises passive personality jurisdic-
tion over crimes with a certain minimum degree of punish-
ment.96 Fourth, some countries provide that the principle is to
be used only when the executive consents to its assertion.9 7 A
92. See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XINGFA art. 6 (1990) (China) (applying
principle only to crimes with a punishment of at least three years of imprisonment);
STRAFFELOVEN [STRFL] § 8(l)(III) (1926, as amended 1988-1989) (Den.) (applying
principle when acts require penalty more severe than simple detention); RIKOSLAKI
[RL] ch. 1, § 3 (1889, as amended 1989) (Fin.) (using principle when act is also a
crime where committed); C. PR. PEN. art. 689, I (Dalloz 1987-88) (Fra.) (using prin-
ciple over all crimes by foreigners abroad that injure French nationals); POINKOs No-
MOs arts. 7, 9 (1990) (Greece) (using principle when act is a felony or misdemeanor);
C.P. art. 7 (1930, with amendments as of 1987) (Italy) (using degree of punishment as
a restriction on use of principle); STRAFFELOVEN [STRFL] § 13 (1902, as amended
1961) (Nor.) (requiring executive approval to use principle); BROTrSBALK [BRB] ch. 2
(1989) (Swed.) (applying principle when offender is found in the territory); 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1203, 2331 (1988) (applying principle to enumerated crimes).
93. See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XINGFA art. 6 (1990) (China) (applying
principle only to crimes with a punishment of at least three years of imprisonment);
STRFL § 8(l)(III) (1926, as amended 1988-89) (Den.) (applying principle when acts
require penalty more severe than simple detention); RL ch. 1, § 3 (1889, as amended
1989) (Fin.).(using principle when act is also a crime where committed); C. PR. PEN.
art. 689, 1 (Dalloz 1987-88) (Fra.) (using principle over all crimes by foreigners
abroad that injure French nationals); POINKos NoMos arts. 7, 9 (1990) (Greece) (us-
ing principle when act is a felony or misdemeanor); C.P. art. 7 (1930, with. amend-
ments as of 1987) (Italy) (using degree of punishment as a restriction on use of prin-
ciple); STRFL § 13 (1902, as amended 1961) (Nor.) (requiring executive approval to
use principle); BRB ch. 2 (1989) (Swed.) (applying principle when offender is found
in the territory); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1203, 2331 (1988) (applying principle to enumerated
crimes).
Italy and the United States are two countries that use a combination.,of these
methods. See C.P. art. 10 (1930, as amended 1987) (Italy) (limiting passive personal-
ity principle to specific crimes with specific degrees of punishment); 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1203, 2331 (e) (1988) (limiting passive personality principle to specific crimes and
requiring certification by the Department ofJustice in some cases).
94. See C. PR. PEN. art. 689, 1 (Dalloz 1987-88) (Fra.); supra note 60 (providing
text of French provision); infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text (discussing
broad application of passive personality principle).
95. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1203, 2331 (1988). For a discussion of the application of
the principle to enumerated crimes, see supra notes 83-87.
96. See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XINGFA art. 6 (1990) (China); STRFL
§ 8(l)(III) (1926, as amended 1988-89) (Den.); C.P. art. 10 (1930, as amended 1987)
(Italy).
97. See RL ch. 1, § 6 (1889, as amended 1989) (Fin.); C.P. art. 10 (1930, as
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fifth method of codifying the principle allows its use only when
the accused is found in the territory of the country seeking to
exercise jurisdiction.98 Sixth, some countries assert passive
personality jurisdiction when the country with territoriality ju-
risdiction does not prosecute.99 Finally, the principle can be
used when the act is also a crime in the country where it oc-
curred. 100
The broad method is the least utilized application of the
principle.' 0 ' The French legislature used this method when it
amended the French Penal Code in 1975 to include passive
personality jurisdiction. 0 2 The French statute provides that
the perpetrator of any crime against a French national abroad
may be prosecuted under French law. '0 3 The French law pro-
vides jurisdiction to the broadest extent possible under the
passive personality principle.'014 Some courts have criticized
such an assertion of passive personality jurisdiction because it
subjects a person to the criminal laws of a country when that
person would have no such expectation. 0 5 Furthermore, such
a broad assertion of passive personality jurisdiction would re-
quire an individual to be familiar with the criminal codes of
many foreign countries. 0 6 This would especially be true in
"international" cities such as New York, Los Angeles, London,
Paris, and Tokyo, where people encounter numerous foreign-
ers on a daily basis.'0 7
amended 1987) (Italy); STRFL § 13 (1902, as amended 1961) (Nor.); BRB ch. 2, § 5
(1989); Beckett, supra note 10, at 48.
98. See C.P. art. 10 (1930, as amended 1987) (Italy); STRFL § 12(4)(b) (1902, as
amended 1961) (Nor.); Beckett, supra note 10, at 48.
99. See KOREAN CRIMINAL CODE art. 6 (1983) (Kor.).
100. See RL ch. 1, § 3 (1889, as amended 1989) (Fin.); POINKOs NoMos art. 7(1)
(1990) (Greece); STRFL § 13 (1902, as amended 1961) (Nor.); BRB ch. 2, § 2 (1989)
(Swed.); STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] § 7(1) (1871, as amended 1986) (W. Ger.).
101. See Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 579; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No.
783, supra note 87, at 87.
102. C. PR. PEN. art. 689, 1 (Dalloz 1987-88) (Fra.). For the text of the statute
see supra note 60.
103. C. PR. PEN. art. 689, 1 (Dalloz 1987-88) (Fra.).
104. See id.; Blakesley, supra note 11, at 938-39 (French law uses passive person-
ality principle to "its fullest measure."); Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 578-
79; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 783, supra note 87, at 87.
105. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 902 (D.D.C. 1988), appeal
docketed, No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1989).
106. See Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 902 n.l 1.
107. See The Lotus Case (Fra. v. Turk.), P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 92 (1923), 2
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The second method applies the passive personality princi-
ple to specifically enumerated crimes.' 08 This method of using
the passive personality principle can be found in two U.S. crim-
inal laws-the Hostage Taking Act' 0 9 and the Antiterrorism
Act."' Under the authority provided by these statutes, the
United States can apply passive personality jurisdiction in
cases involving hostage taking," I homicide, attempted homi-
cide, and physical violence with intent to cause serious bodily
injury to a U.S. national. 1 2 This method is also codified to
apply the passive personality principle to only certain classes of
crimes." 3 The Greek penal code utilizes this method by limit-
ing passive personality jurisdiction to felonies and misdemean-
ors. '14
Another method applies the passive personality principle
to crimes with a minimum degree of punishment. 1 5 The Ital-
ian penal code employs this method," 6 by applying passive
personality jurisdiction to offenses for which the minimum
penalty is one year of incarceration. 1"' This method excludes
petty crimes for which only minor punishment is provided.",,
Some countries have codified the passive personality prin-
ciple but require executive consent in each case that relies on
the principle for jurisdiction."t 9 This method enables a gov-
HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS 20, 82 (1929) (Moore, J. dissenting) ("In this way
an inhabitant of a great commercial city, in which foreigners congregate, may in the
course of an hour unconsciously fall under the operation of a number of foreign
criminal codes.").
108. See 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988). See supra notes 83-
87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Hostage Taking Act and the An-
titerrorism Act.
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1988). See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text for
a discussion of this statute.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988). See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text for
a discussion of this statute.
111. 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1988).
112. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988).
113. See, e.g., POINKOS NoMos art. 7 (1990) (Greece).
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., C.P. art. 10 (1930, as amended 1987) (Italy) (applying passive per-
sonality principle to crimes where punishment is at least one year of incarceration).
116. See id.
117. Id. "Italian law prescribes [the punishment of death or] life imprisonment,
or imprisonment for a minimum of not less than one year .. " ITALIAN PENAL CODE
(E. Wise trans. 1978) (American Series of Foreign Penal Codes, No. 23).
118. See C.P. art. 10 (1930, as amended 1987) (Italy).
119. See RL ch. 1, § 6 (1889, as amended 1989) (Fin.); C.p. art. 10 (1930, as
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ernment to avoid conflicts with other states over the assertion
of passive personality jurisdiction.120 For example, the Norwe-
gian Penal Code provides that the king must commence all
legal proceedings based on passive personality jurisdiction.' 2 '
Finland, Italy, and Sweden also require executive consent for
the application of the principle. 22
The Antiterrorism Act of the United States includes a pro-
vision that is analogous to the executive consent requirement
in the Norwegian code.' 23 This provision requires an officer in
the U.S. Attorney General's office, an administrative office of
the executive branch, to certify that the prosecution involves a
certain type of crime.' 24 Without the certification, a U.S. court
cannot exercise passive personality jurisdiction over a crime
prosecuted under this statute. 25
Some countries assert passive personality jurisdiction only
when the alleged criminal is found in the territory of the coun-
try intending to prosecute. 12 6 The Italian penal code contains
this method of using passive personality jurisdiction. 27 This
method can be used in two ways. First, it can be applied to
cases where the alleged offender voluntarily enters the coun-
try.' 28 Second, it can be applied in cases of extradition, kid-
amended 1987) (Italy); STRFL § 13 (1902, as amended 1961) (Nor.); BRB ch. 2, § 5
(1989) (Swed.).
120. See Beckett, supra note 10, at 48 (noting that this method allows a govern-
ment to avoid conflicts with countries not using the principle).
121. STRYL § 13 (1902, as amended 1961) (Nor.). Under Norwegian law, "legal
proceedings [relying on the passive personality principle] can be initiated only by the
decision of the King." THE NORWEGIAN PENAL CODE (H. Schjoldager trans. 1961)
(American Series of Foreign Penal Codes, No. 3).
122. RL ch. 1, § 6 (1889, as amended 1989) (Fin.); C.P. art. 10 (1930, as
amended 1987) (Italy); BRB ch. 2, § 5 (1989) (Swed.).
123. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(e) (1988).
124. Id. The attorney general, or the highest ranking subordinate of the attor-
ney general, must certify that the defendant's act was intended to coerce a govern-
ment or civilian population. Id. The certification is not subject to judicial review.
H.R. CONF. REP., supra note 87, at 87-88.
125. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(e) (1988); H.R. CONF. REP., supra note 87, at 87-88.
126. See, e.g., C.P. art. 10 (1930, as amended 1987) (Italy); STRFL § 12 (1902, as
amended 1961) (Nor.).
127. See C.P. art. 10 (1930, as amended 1987) (Italy).
128. See, e.g., C.P.D.F. art. 186 (1886) (Mex.). The Mexican statute at issue in
Cutting's Case, required that "the accused be in [Mexico], whether . . . voluntarily or
... brought [in] by extradition." Cutting's Case, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 1887 FOREIGN
RELATIONS 751, 760 (1888), 2 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 228, 230-31
(1906) (translating art. 186 of Mexican Penal Code); see STRFL § 12 (1902, as
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napping, or arrest in international waters where the offender is
brought into the territory of the prosecuting country.129 In the
second case, the "found-in-the-territory" limitation stems from
the principle in international law that a person cannot be tried
for a crime unless they are present at the trial.
130
Another method of using passive personality jurisdiction
is to employ it when the state with territoriality jurisdiction
does not try the crime. 13  The Korean Criminal Code utilizes
this method; 132 it protects the offender from "double jeop-
ardy.' 33 This method also guards against diplomatic tension
caused by two countries disputing who has jurisdiction over
the criminal act.13
4
There is also a requirement in some countries' statutes
that the act be a crime in the country in which it occurred.'
35
The Finnish penal code includes this requirement for the as-
sertion of passive personality jurisdiction. 36 This method re-
amended 1961) (Nor.) (applying passive personality principle when foreigner is dom-
iciled or staying in Norway).
129. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909, 915 (D.D.C.) (holding that
trial court was not required to divest itself of personal jurisdiction despite unusual
method of arrest), rev'd in part 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988); M. Bassiouni, Unlawful
Seizures and Irregular Rendition Devices as Alternatives to Extradition, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 25 (1973) (discussing various means of getting offender into the territory); Lewis,
Scholars Say Arrest of Noriega Has LittleJustification in Law, N.Y. Times,Jan. 10, 1990, at
A12, col. 1. This article noted that U.S. courts have not dismissed any case when the
method of bringing the suspect before the court has been questionable, such as ab-
duction or kidnapping. Id.; see United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d
Cir.), reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (1974), motion to dismiss denied on remand, 398 F. Supp.
916, 917 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). In Toscanino, the Second Circuit held that "due process
[requires] a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
where it has been acquired as a result of the government's deliberate, unnecessary
and unreasonable invasion of the accused constitutional rights." Toscanino, 500 F.2d
at 275. On remand, however, the district court held that due process did not require
it to divest itself of personal jurisdiction over the defendant because of the unusual
method of apprehension. Toscanino, 398 F. Supp. at 917.
130. Sarkar, supra note 10, at 66; Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 616.
131. See, e.g., KOREAN CRIMINAL CODE art. 6 (1983) (Kor.); see Blakesley, supra
note 11, at 909-10.
132. See KOREAN CRIMINAL CODE art. 6 (1983) (Kor.).
133. Sarkar, supra note 10, at 66; see Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 616.
134. See Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 443.
135. See, e.g., RL ch. 1, § 3 (1889, as amended 1989) (Fin.); PoINKos NoMos art.
7(1) (1990) (Greece); STRFL § 13 (1902, as amended 1961) (Nor.); BRB ch. 2, § 2
(1989) (Swed.).
136. See RL ch. 1, § 3 (1889, as amended 1989) (Fin.). Finnish law applies the
passive personality principle to a "criminal act perpetrated outside of Finland, if it is
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lieves an individual of the burden of having to know the laws of
foreign countries. 37 Greece, Norway, and Sweden also utilize
this method. 3 1
Although the validity of the passive personality principle is
no longer in question, the principle is still a matter of contro-
versy because no agreement has been reached regarding its
scope.' 39  When the international community reaches an
agreement on the scope of the principle, it will become an
even more effective basis of jurisdiction.
III. APPLICATION OF THE PASSIVE PERSONALITY
PRINCIPLE TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM
A. The Need for Uniformity
The last two decades have witnessed a dramatic increase
in the number of occurrences of international terrorism each
year,' 40 and increasingly, terrorist acts are committed on the
basis of the victim's nationality.' 4 ' During the last few decades
also punishable according to the law of the place of the act." THE FINNISH PENAL
CODE (American Series of Foreign Penal Codes, No. 27) (M. Joutsen trans. 1987).
137. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 902 n. I1 (D.D.C. 1988) (not-
ing that it might be too much to expect individuals to know laws of every country),
appeal docketed, No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1989).
138. See POINKOS NoMos art. 7(1) (1990) (Greece); STRFL § 13 (1902, as
amended 1961) (Nor.); BRB ch. 2, § 2 (1989) (Swed.).
139. See supra notes 92-139 and accompanying text (discussing current methods
of using passive personality principle).
140. N. LIVINGSTONE & T. ARNOLD, supra note 1, at 12; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
PATrERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1988, at 1 (1989) (reporting 856 incidents of ter-
rorism in 1988, up from 832 in 1987); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATrERNS OF GLOBAL
TERRORISM: 1986, at 1 (1988) (reporting 744 incidents of terrorism in 1986, halting
upward trend); Kane, supra note 1, at 295 (Department of State reported 782 inci-
dents of terrorism in 1985); Mastrangelo, supra note 1, at 7.
141. Bell, supra note 2, at 307-09.
There are several examples of acts of terrorism directed at particular individuals
because of their nationality. On September 5, 1972, nine members of the Israeli
Olympic team were murdered while attending the Munich Olympics. Binder, 9 Israe-
lis On Olympic Team Killed With 4 Arab Captors As Police Fight Band That Disrupted Munich
Games, N.Y. Times, Sep. 6, 1972, at Al, col. 6. On November 4, 1979, 60 U.S. nation-
als were taken hostage in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran. Gwertzman, U.S. Rejects
Demand of Students in Iran to Send Shah Back, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1979, at Al, col. 6;
Reuters, Teheran Students Seize U.S. Embassy and Hold Hostages, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5,
1979, at Al, col. 6. On December 21, 1988, a Pan American World Airways flight
carrying primarily U.S. nationals, was destroyed over Scotland by a bomb that had
been placed on the plane by a terrorist group. Whitney,jetliner Carrying 258 to U.S.
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the international community has increasingly accepted the pas-
sive personality principle as applied to terrorism but not as ap-
plied to ordinary torts and crimes.' 42 The international scope
of terrorist acts is one reason for the principle's acceptance. 143
Asserting passive personality jurisdiction over acts of terrorism
does not infringe on the sovereignty interest of the state with
territoriality jurisdiction as in cases of ordinary torts and
crimes. 144 In order to bring more effectively those responsible
for such acts to justice the international community should
adopt a uniform approach to the use of the passive personality
principle.
The passive personality principle would be most effective
if applied on a uniform basis by all states. Uniform application
of the principle serves three national goals. First, it would en-
sure extradition in cases properly relying on the principle.' 45
Second, uniformity would ensure fairness in the use of the
principle. 146 Third, uniform application would allow a state to
provide better protection for its nationals abroad. 14
Uniform application of the principle would ensure extradi-
tion so that the interested country could prosecute the of-
fender. When deciding whether to extradite an alleged of-
fender, one of the main considerations is jurisdiction. 148 If the
laws of the country that has possession of the offender do not
provide for, or conflict with, the type ofjurisdiction asserted by
the country requesting extradition, extradition may be re-
fused.149 By adopting a uniform application of the passive per-
Crashes in Scottish Town, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1988, at AI, col. 6. See generally U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1988, at 8-44 (1989) (discussing
incidents of terrorism directed at nationals of various countries).
142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, § 402 comment g.
143. See id.
144. See The Lotus Case (Fra. v. Turk.), P.C.I.J. (ser. A.) No. 10, at 35, 44-45,
101-02 (1923), 2 HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS 20, 47, 53-54, 88 (1929); infra
note 165 (discussing how use of passive personality principle can infringe on sover-
eign interest of state with territoriality jurisdiction).
145. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text (discussing need for uniform-
ity to ensure extradition). '
146. See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text (discussing need for uniform-
ity to ensure fairness).
147. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text (discussing need for uniform-
ity to provide better protection for nationals abroad).
148. M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at 270.
149. Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction Over Extraterri-
torial Crimes, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 685, 744. Examples of this can be found in the his-
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sonality principle, countries should be willing to extradite of-
fenders to states asserting such jurisdiction.' 0
Second, a uniform application of the passive personality
principle is necessary to provide fairness in its use.' One of
the arguments against the passive personality principle is that
it subjects an individual to the laws of foreign countries to
which that individual would not expect to be subject.' 5 2 Were
the passive personality principle applied on a uniform basis, an
individual can expect to be subject to certain foreign laws.' 53
Thus, countries can use the passive personality principle with
little opposition from other states in the international commu-
nity. 154
Finally, the uniform application of the passive personality
principle will allow states to provide better protection for their
nationals abroad. 55 The uniform application will put individ-
uals on notice that if they commit a crime against nationals of
another country, that country may punish them regardless of
where the act occurs. 15 6 This application should deter criminal
acts because individuals may no longer expect to be free from
prosecution where the country in which the act occurs is un-
likely to prosecute. 5 7 In addition, because extradition will be
tory of the passive personality principle. In 1975, prior to U.S. acceptance of the
principle, the United States refused to extradite certain prisoners to the Federal Re-
public of Germany when passive personality jurisdiction was asserted. U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, DIGEST OF THE UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 177 (1975).
Following the forced landing of the Achille Lauro hijackers in Italy, the United
States requested extradition from Italy relying on the passive personality principle.
The U.S.-Italian Quarrel, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1985, at A8, col. 5. Although Italy re-
fused to extradite the hijackers, it did prosecute them. See id.
150. See Blakesley, supra note 149, at 744 (noting that basis of jurisdiction is of
concern in extradition requests).
151. See The Lotus Case (Fra. v. Turk.), P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 92 (1923), 2
HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS 20, 82 (1929) (Moore, J. dissenting) (discussing
unfairness of unsuspecting individual being subject to foreign laws under passive
personality principle).
152. Id. For a discussion of this argument, see supra note 37.
153. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 902 (D.D.C. 1988) (noting
that in some cases offenders should expect to be prosecuted by other countries),
appeal docketed, No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1989).
154. See Beckett, supra note 10, at 48 (discussing how countries seek to avoid
conflict in cases using passive personality jurisdiction).
155. Sarkar, supra note 10, at 66.
156. See Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 902 & n. 11 (noting that offenders should expect
to be prosecuted by other countries when they injure their nationals).
157. See N. LIVINGSTONE & T. ARNOLD, supra note 1, at 14; Rosenthal, On My
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easier for the country seeking custody, thereby increasing the
likelihood of prosecution, individuals will be further deterred
from targeting nationals of countries that use the passive per-
sonality principle. 5 8
B. A Proposed Application of the Principle
1. Terms of the Proposal
The purpose of the passive personality principle is to al-
low a country to protect its nationals when they are outside its
territorial limits.' 59 Such protection is likely to be most effec-
tive if the principle is used or accepted by the entire commu-
nity of nations. Acceptance, however, is most likely only if the
principle is enacted with certain limitations. 160 One such limi-
tation would be to apply the principle to instances involving
acts of international terrorism that are directed at individuals
due to their nationality.'61 International terrorism should be
defined for purposes of the passive personality principle as acts
of planned violence outside the context of war that are di-
rected against individuals or property and that are designed to
achieve results by creating fear, or that are committed to
achieve violent results as ends in themselves. 162 By defining
Mind, The Mad Circle, N.Y. Times, Sep. 22, 1989, at A35, col. 5. For example, in the
Achille Lauro affair, Italy released two of the accomplices to the hijacking. Weinraub,
Italy Said to Free 2 P.L.O. Aides; U.S. Issues a Warrant for One; Hostages Tell of a "Death
List", N.Y. Times Oct. 13, 1985, at Al, col. 6; see The U.S.-Italian Quarrel, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 18, 1985, at A8, col. 5.
158. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the need
for uniformity to ensure extradition.
159. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of passive
personality principle).
160. Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 579; see supra notes 49-50 and ac-
companying text (discussing need for limits on passive personality principle).
161. See McGinley, supra note 12, at 712-13 (noting that passive personality prin-
ciple not illogical when victim singled out because of nationality).
162. Defining terrorism in this manner may further two goals: first, it may en-
courage uniform acceptance of the definition, second, it may lead to acceptance of
the application of the passive personality principle to international terrorism directed
at the victim because of nationality. Defining terrorism in this way allows more flexi-
bility in determining if an act is in fact terrorism. Moreover, it only applies the pas-
sive personality principle to acts of terrorism that the perpetrator knows are wrong.
See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 902 n. II (D.D.C. 1988), appeal docketed,
No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1989).
It should be noted, however, that the international community has been unable
to agree on a uniform definition of international terrorism. J. MURPHY, STATE SUP-
PORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 3 (1989); Blakesley, supra note 11, at 901-03;
322 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 13:298
international terrorism in this manner, passive personality ju-
risdiction is limited to crimes that the offender knows are ille-
gal. 163
The most important limitation in this proposal is that the
act be directed at individuals because of their nationality. With
this qualification, the interests of both the country with territo-
riality jurisdiction and the country with passive personality ju-
risdiction may be reconciled. 64  This limitation would allow
the country with passive personality jurisdiction to assert it in
cases where its interest outweighs that of the country with ter-
ritoriality jurisdiction, thereby preserving the sovereignty of
the country with territoriality jurisdiction to the greatest ex-
tent. 165
Hannay, supra note 1, at 268 n. 1 (noting that precise meaning of terrorism in debate);
Lodge, Introduction- Terrorism and Europe.- Some General Considerations, in THE THREAT OF
TERRORISM 1 (J. Lodge ed. 1988); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TER-
RORISM: 1988, at iv (1989); see European Convention on the Suppression of Terror-
ism, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976); Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Interna-
tional Terrorism, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) 1, U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973); Organ-
ization of American States Convention on Terrorism, Feb. 2, 1971, T.I.A.S. 8413.
Even in the United States there is disagreement on the definition of international
terrorism. U.S. law states that an
"act of terrorism" means an activity that ... involves a violent act or an act
dangerous to human life that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United
States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed
within the jurisdiction of the United States or any State; and ... appears to
be intended ... to intimidate or coerce a civilian population ... to influence
the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion .. .or to affect the
conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.
18 U.S.C. § 3077 (1988).
One author defines terrorism as "the intentional or extremely reckless applica-
tion of violence against innocent individuals or property for the purpose of obtaining
a military, political or religiose end." Blakesley, supra note 11, at 902-03 (emphasis
omitted). Another author states that
[tierrorism itself can be defined as a process that involves the intentional use
of violence, or threat of violence, against an instrumental target in order to
communicate to a primary target a threat of future violence so as both to
coerce the primary target into behavior or attitudes through intense fear or
anxiety and to serve a particular political end.
Paust, supra note 43, at 192-93.
163. See Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 902 n.l 1. In Yunis the court noted that under the
passive personality principle, people could be subject to foreign laws for acts that
they did not know were illegal. Id.
164. Blakesley, supra note 11, at 909.
165. Id. A primary objection to the passive personality principle, as well as to
other types of extraterritorial jurisdiction, is that it infringes upon the sovereignty of
the country with territoriality jurisdiction. See The Lotus Case (Fra. v. Turk.), P.C.I.J.
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2. The Proposal and the Goals of Uniformity
This proposal for the application of the passive personal-
ity principle to terrorist acts would achieve the three goals of
uniformity. 166 The proposal would ensure extradition in cases
involving international terrorism directed at individuals be-
cause of their nationality, ensure fairness in the application of
the passive personality principle, and would assist states in bet-
ter protecting their nationals abroad.
By circumscribing the application of the passive personal-
ity principle, it is more likely that the proposal would lead to
the uniform acceptance of the principle.' 67 Uniform adoption
of the proposal would ensure that extradition will occur when
the passive personality principle is properly asserted.i 68 In
cases where the proposal applies, extradition would be easier
because both countries would agree on the basis ofjurisdiction
as well as the instances to which it is applicable.
The two limitations of the proposed application of the
passive personality principle would also ensure fairness in the
use of the principle. 169 By applying the principle to cases of
international terrorism, the proposal would apply only to cases
where the offenders realize that their acts are illegal. 70 The
second limitation, that the victims be targeted because of their
nationality, provides for just application of the principle be-
cause the offender has reason to expect to be prosecuted by
(ser. A.) No. 10, at 35, 44-45, 101-02 (1923), 2 HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS 20,
47, 53-54, 88 (1929).
Professor Blakesley asserts that there is a hierarchy of concurrent jurisdiction in
international law regarding the five bases of criminal jurisdiction. Blakesley,Jurisdic-
tion, supra note I1, at 909. In that hierarchy, the territoriality principle is the highest
priority jurisdiction. Id. While the country with territoriality jurisdiction has a great
interest in asserting jurisdiction in order to ensure peace in its territory, the state
whose citizens are targeted as victims has a greater interest because more likely than
not the perpetrators of the terrorist act are more concerned with the persons they
target than where the act occurs. Id.
166. See supra notes 145-58 and accompanying text (discussing need for uni-
formity).
167. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing need to limit passive
personality principle to achieve uniform acceptance).
168. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text (discussing need for uni-
formity to ensure extradition).
169. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text (discussing how uniformity
would ensure fairness in use of passive personality principle).
170. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 902 n. I (D.D.C. 1988), appeal
docketed, No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1989).
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the victim's country.17'
Finally, the proposal would also satisfy the third goal of
uniformity-the better protection of nationals abroad. 72 By
providing a more effective method of bringing international
terrorists to justice, the proposal may act as a deterrent to ter-
rorists.
This proposal for the uniform application of the passive
personality principle should help bring terrorists to justice.
While it does contain some features that are already employed
in the criminal laws of various states, 173 it is a new approach
that, if used on a uniform basis, should lead to the effective
prosecution of terrorists.
C. The Ineffectiveness of Current Applications of the Passive
Personality Principle in Combatting International Terrorism
This proposed use of the passive personality principle dif-
fers from the broad application of the passive personality prin-
ciple in the French penal code. 74 The French penal code
grants passive personality jurisdiction over all crimes commit-
ted by individuals against French nationals abroad. 75 Because
most states, however, would be unwilling to adopt the broad
approach of the French penal code, it would not be an effective
method of combatting international terrorism. 176 In order for
the passive personality principle to be effective in this regard,
it must be adopted on a uniform basis.' 7 7 Thus, the proposed
approach will be more effective against terrorism than the
French application.
Countries that apply the principle to prosecute certain
171. See id.
172. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text (discussing goal of better
protecting nationals).
173. See supra notes 92-139 and accompanying text (discussing current methods
of using passive personality principle).
174. C. PR. PEN. art. 689, 1 (Dalloz 1987-88) (Fra.). For a discussion of the
French method, see supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
175. C. PR. PEN. art. 689, 1 (Dalloz 1987-88) (Fra.). See supra notes 102-04 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the French statute.
176. Harvard Research Project, supra note 4, at 579; see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 783,
supra note 87, at 87.
177. See supra notes 145-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the need
for uniformity.
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enumerated crimes offer another possible approach.' With-
out agreement as to the crimes enumerated,' 7 9 however, this
approach alone fails to apply most effectively the passive per-
sonality principle. ' 8
0
The method used by countries such as Italy and Turkey,
which apply the passive personality principle to crimes with a
certain minimum degree of punishment, would similarly be un-
workable in establishing a uniform application of the princi-
ple.' 8 ' Applying the principle in this manner would again lead
to inconsistencies because most countries impose different de-
grees of punishment for the same crimes.' As a result,
crimes to which the principle would apply in one country could
be different from the crimes to which it would apply in another
country. If, under the authority provided by the passive per-
sonality principle, a country was seeking extradition for a
crime to which the country with custody of the offender con-
cluded that the principle did not apply under its laws, the
country with custody may refuse to extradite.' 83 This result
would again defeat the purpose of adopting a uniform ap-
proach to the passive personality principle.' 84
Norway and Finland require executive consent in each
178. See POINKOs NoMos art. 7, 8 (1990) (Greece); 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1988); 18
U.S.C. § 2331 (1988); supra notes 95, 108-14 and accompanying text (discussing ap-
plication of principle to enumerated crimes only).
179. See supra notes 145-58 and accompanying text (discussing the need for uni-
formity).
180. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1988) and 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988) (allowing
passive personality jurisdiction over hostage taking and certain violent acts) with
POINKOs Nomos arts. 7, 8 (Aug. 1990) (Greece) (allowing passive personality jurisdic-
tion over felonies and misdemeanors).
181. See POINKOs NoMos art. 7, 9 (1990) (Greece); C.P. art. 10 (1930, as
amended 1987) (Italy); CEZA HUKUKu art. 6 (1926) (Turk.); supra notes 106, 115-18
and accompanying text (discussing approach requiring crime with minimum degree
of punishment).
182. Compare RL ch. 37, § 1 (1989) (Fin.) (2-6 years of incarceration for counter-
feiting) and C.P. art. 453 (1930, as amended 1987) (Italy) (3-12 years ofjail and a fine
for counterfeiting) with 18 U.S.C. § 471 (1988) (fine up to $5,000 and/or imprison-
ment up to 15 years for counterfeiting).
183. Blakesley, supra note 149, at 744; see M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRA-
DITION, supra note 12, at 270 (noting that in extradition, basis of jurisdiction is a
consideration).
184. See supra notes 145-58 and accompanying text (discussing need for uni-
formity).
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case before the use of the passive personality principle.1
85
This method serves to lessen diplomatic tensions caused by the
use of passive personality jurisdiction. 8 6 The use of the prin-
ciple could achieve the same result as the proposed method if
every executive allowed the use of passive personality jurisdic-
tion only when the act in question was committed because of
the victim's nationality. This method, however, would not be
as effective as the proposed approach because of political pres-
sures often confronting an executive. Without any other check
upon the principle, political pressure might compel the execu-
tive to allow or in some cases prevent the assertion of passive
personality jurisdiction. 8 7 By adopting a uniform approach
that precludes the influence of external pressures, the passive
personality principle can be effectively applied.
Two other methods of applying the passive personality
principle conform with other existing principles of interna-
tional law. First, the found-in-the-territory method stems from
the principle that a defendant must be present at the trial.' 88
Second, the requirement that the country with territoriality ju-
risdiction not prosecute evolves from the theory of prevention
of double jeopardy.' 89 The rationale behind these methods
exist independently from the passive personality principle in
international law and, therefore, automatically act as limits on
the proposed method of using passive personality jurisdiction.
The final method used by states to apply the principle is
by limiting it to cases where the offense is also a crime in the
country in which it occurred. 9 0 In this manner, the offender is
apparently aware that the act is illegal and should expect to be
subject to punishment.' 9 ' This approach is not an effective
185. See supra notes 97, 119-22 and accompanying text (discussing executive ap-
proval method).
186. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of executive
approval method).
187. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text (discussing executive con-
sent requirement).
188. C.P. art. 10 (1930, as amended 1987) (Italy); see supra notes 98, 126-30 and
accompanying text (discussing "found-in-the-territory" method).
189. See supra notes 92, 131-34 and accompanying text (discussing method re-
quiring that country with territoriality jurisdiction not prosecute).
190. See supra notes 100, 135-38 and accompanying text (discussing method ap-
plying principle to cases where act is crime where committed).
191. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 902 n.l I (D.D.C. 1988), appeal
docketed, No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1989). The court stated that "it is not un-
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method of combatting terrorist acts because, if such an act
were not illegal where it occurs, the principle could not be ap-
plied. This could allow countries that sponsor terrorist activi-
ties to defeat effectively such an application of the principle.
The passive personality principle in its present forms of
codification provides limited effectiveness. The principle,
however, could be more effectively used to combat terrorism if
adopted by the international community on a uniform basis.
The uniform acceptance of the principle would provide for
easier extradition of terrorists, fairness in its use, and greater
protection of nationals travelling or living abroad. The pro-
posed application to acts of international terrorism that are di-
rected at the victims due to nationality will give greater effect
to the principle and provide for its just utilization.
CONCLUSION
The frequent occurrence of terrorist acts is an ever in-
creasing problem facing the international community. The
uniform adoption and application of the passive personality
principle will allow nations to bring terrorists to justice for
their crimes. By working together with this new weapon for
combatting terrorism, the international community can strive
toward the eventual eradication of terrorism.
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realistic to assume that Ethe average citizen] would realize that committing a terrorist
act might subject him to foreign prosecution." Id. (citation omitted).
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